Trade Spillovers of Domestic Subsidies

Trade Spillovers of Domestic Subsidies
READ MORE...
Volume/Issue: Volume 2024 Issue 041
Publication date: March 2024
ISBN: 9798400269486
$20.00
Add to Cart by clicking price of the language and format you'd like to purchase
Available Languages and Formats
English
Prices in red indicate formats that are not yet available but are forthcoming.
Topics covered in this book

This title contains information about the following subjects. Click on a subject if you would like to see other titles with the same subjects.

Exports and Imports , Economics- Macroeconomics , Economics / General , Subsidies , Industrial Policy , International Trade , Spillovers , trade spillover , spillover effect , subsidy share , effects of subsidy , subsidized product , Trade balance , Exports , Imports , Trade policy , Export competitiveness , Global

Summary

As governments resort to industrial policies to achieve economic and non-economic objectives, the number of subsidies implemented each year has more than tripled in the last decade. Using detailed data across a large number of advanced and emerging economies, we empirically investigate the effects of domestic subsidies on international trade flows. Estimates from a difference-in-difference specification show that on average subsidies promote both exports and imports. These effects are partly driven by selection into subsidies, as governments target export-oriented and import-competing products. The results however mask significant differences across countries. Specifically, exports of subsidized products from G20 emerging markets increase 8 percent more than exports of other products, with no evidence of selection. The gravity estimates confirm that subsidies promote international relative to domestic trade. These spillover effects are concentrated in some industries, such as electrical machinery, and are stronger when subsidies are given through tax breaks than other policy instruments. The subsidy-led rise in trade calls for international cooperation to manage risks of retaliatory actions and possible drifts towards a subsidy war.