Inflation, Debt, and Default in a Monetary Union

Depending on the preferences of the central bank, countries in a monetary union tend to accumulate less debt. This reduces the need for fiscal criteria such as debt ceilings. In a monetary union with an independent central bank and a sufficiently large number of relatively small members, investors will begin rationing credit to the government more rapidly, and an equilibrium with no inflation and no default exists. However, highly-indebted countries are more likely to default once they join a monetary union.
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Volume/Issue: Volume 2000 Issue 179
Publication date: November 2000
ISBN: 9781451859027
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Topics covered in this book

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Business and Economics , Banks and Banking , Exports and Imports , Inflation , Economics- Macroeconomics , WP , monetary policy , Public debt , inflation , monetary union , default , government default , budget constraint , regime switch , loss function , government set , government credit , Price stabilization , Monetary unions , Bonds , Debt service

Summary

Depending on the preferences of the central bank, countries in a monetary union tend to accumulate less debt. This reduces the need for fiscal criteria such as debt ceilings. In a monetary union with an independent central bank and a sufficiently large number of relatively small members, investors will begin rationing credit to the government more rapidly, and an equilibrium with no inflation and no default exists. However, highly-indebted countries are more likely to default once they join a monetary union.