Auction Quotas with a Foreign Duopoly

This paper uses a partial equilibrium framework to compare the welfare consequences of different methods of quota administration relative to free trade under imperfect competition. It shows that a country importing a good from foreign duopolists may improve its welfare by setting a quota at the free trade quantity and giving a fraction of the quota licenses to the duopolists while auctioning off the rest.
Publication date: March 2000
ISBN: 9781451848670
$15.00
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International - Economics , International - Economics , Service , Service , Auction quota , duopoly , free trade , importing country , quantitative restrictions , quota rents

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