Fiscal Performance, Institutional Design and Decentralization in European Union Countries

Author: Luc Eyraud, Ms. Anita Tuladhar, Mr. Julio Escolano, Ms. Marialuz Moreno Badia, and Ms. Juliane Sarnes

Volume/Issue: Volume 2012 Issue 045

Publication date: February 2012

ISBN: 9781463936464

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Topics covered in this book

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Economics- Macroeconomics , Public Finance , WP , government , country , Lagged government debt , Fiscal decentralization , fiscal institutions , fiscal rules , European Union , national government , access to borrowing , authorities' access , central government , expenditure share , government tier , Fiscal federalism , Fiscal stance , General government spending , Eastern Europe , Europe

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Summary

This paper analyzes the impact of decentralization on overall fiscal performance in the European Union, taking into account fiscal institutional arrangements. We find that spending decentralization has been associated with sizably better fiscal performance, especially when transfer dependency of subnational governments is low. However, subnational fiscal rules do not seem to be associated with better performance.